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Non-binary gender concepts and the evolving legal treatment of UK transsexed 







This essay seeks to bridge the gap between the UK legal system’s treatment of 
transsexuals and post-structuralist gender theory. It argues that whilst the greater 
representation of transsexuals in UK legal discourse embodied in the Gender Recognition Act 
is a positive move forward in terms of classic liberal notions of human rights and in its 
acceptance of transsexuals as proper subjects before the law, it nonetheless represents an 
essentialist conception of transsexuals; requiring them to ‘fit’ within binary categories of 
male and female. It is argued that post-structuralist thought regarding gender can illuminate 
some of the problems inherent within the UK legal system’s treatment of transsexuals and 
particularly focuses on the work of Judith Butler. There is further detailed consideration of 
the UK legal system’s treatment of transsexuals prior to the Gender Recognition Act and a 
response to some of the criticisms levelled at the applicability of Butlerian thought to real-
world scenarios. 
 




‘How human beings should be represented in social thought is a pressing 
moral question, but whether they should be represented is not’ (Binder & 
Weisberg, 1996-1997: p. 1151). 
 
What, if any, is the place of post-structuralism in human rights law? Post-structuralism 
can be broadly conceptualised as a scepticism of the enlightenment – scepticism of the belief 
in the ability of language or discourse to accurately represent truth (Belsey, 2002: p. 10). 
Meanwhile, the English legal system’s human rights jurisprudence still owes much to the 
Enlightenment – a belief in, amongst many other things, individual freedom and personal 
autonomy and on the reliability of scientific truth. The goal of this essay is certainly not to 
impugn or disavow the entire trajectory of human rights law and jurisprudence, but to 
question its application to the rights of transsexuals in the English legal system. What if the 
current framework of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is inadequately representing the 
rights and the legitimate expectations of the subjects which it claims to represent? If the 
current ‘truth’ is failing in its goals of democratic representation – could there therefore be 
scope for accommodation of other forms of ‘truth’ within the legal discourse?  
This essay will critically consider this possibility and ask in particular whether post-
structuralist thought regarding gender has any applicability in the legal treatment of 
transsexed individuals in the law in light of the Gender Recognition Act 2004. The Act gives 
individuals the right to apply to have their legal gender reassigned, provided the subject ‘has 
lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending with the date on which 
the application is made’ and ‘intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death’ 
(Section 2 (1) (b)-(c)). It will be argued that this piece of legislation is ultimately essentialist 
and suffers from the same adherence to supposedly objective gender criteria of male and 
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female which stand in contrast to non-binary conceptions of gender articulated by post-
structuralism which, it will be argued, presents a more accurate representation of the means 
by which gender identity is presented in the case of transsexuality. This essay will begin with 
an assessment of the theoretical background of post-structuralist thought regarding gender as 
an analytical framework for the legal analysis which follows. Particular attention will be 
drawn to the work of Judith Butler, whose conception of gender performativity and fluid, 
non-binary conceptions of gender run alongside the case of transsexuality (medicalised as 
gender dysphoria). Whilst there are, of course, strains of post-structuralism distinct from 
Butler’s, since Butler’s philosophy forms the most substantive attempt to apply post-
structuralism to gender, it is perhaps the one most relevant for a critique of the law relating to 
transsexuals. As Sandland argues, the case of transsexuality forces law into ‘revealing the 
contingency of its claim to truth’ (1995), since transsexuality seems to disrupt the notion of a 
rigid separation between male and female, a separation which leaves little room for 
ambiguity. Finally, a critical analysis of the capabilities of Butlerian conceptions of gender 
will be applied to question what practical applicability, if any, post-structuralist thought has 
for the English legal system’s treatment of so-called transgender subjects. 
 
 
Transgender vs. Transsexed 
A crucial precursor to our discussion is the submission that the term transgender is 
itself a misnomer (Whittle, 2002: p. 7). As McGuiness and Alghrani note regarding 
individuals who undergo sexual reassignment surgery, whilst the biological ‘sex’ of the 
individuals is changed, ‘[t]he gender of these individuals remains constant’ (2008: p. 264). 
This echoes the distinction between sex and gender implied by Beauvoir’s notion that ‘one is 
not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (1988: 295) - the act of birth being the biological 
‘truth’ of the child’s sex, the act of ‘becoming’ the discursive social construction of gender. In 
the case of sexual reassignment surgery, the ‘becoming’ is biological and the gender of the 
individual remains the same. The submission, therefore, is that individuals who have 
undergone sexual reassignment surgery are referred to as transsexed and not transgendered. 
For the purposes of this essay the former term will be favoured. It should be noted that, in a 
political and legal context, oftentimes the terms sex and gender are mistakenly used 
interchangeably and as though they were synonymous. For instance, in Parliament’s debate 
over the Gender Recognition Bill at (HC Deb, 2004). Also in Goodwin v UK (2002) and in 
Bellinger v Bellinger ‘for present purposes the two terms are interchangeable’ (2002: 1177). 
 
 
Essentialism and legal conceptions of gender 
In order to critique the essentialism of the law regarding transsexed individuals, it is 
first necessary to briefly outline what is meant by the term essentialism and how the law can 
be shown to operate according to this framework. Essentialism is a term subject to a variety 
of definitions and reconstitutions. The Oxford English Dictionary defines essentialism as 
‘[t]he belief in real essences of things, esp. the view that the task of science and philosophy is 
to discover these and express them in definitions’ (2010). Essentialism regarding individuals 
is, Mackie notes ‘the view that individual things have essential properties, where an essential 
property of an object is a property that the object could not have existed without’ (2006: p.1). 
In terms of gender, therefore, the essentialist conception holds that there are two binary 
categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and that each of these categories has certain properties 
which precede its definition. For our purposes, however, it will not be necessary to embark on 
an exhaustive account of the varied and nuanced accounts of different kinds of essentialism in 
the hope that we may arrive at a constitution of essentialism itself, for such an effort would be 
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consigned to inadequacy. What will be necessary, however, is to discuss in what ways the 
legal treatment of transsexed individuals can be said to be essentialist. In other words: what 
are the essential qualities of essentialism and, furthermore, how are these in operation 
regarding the legal treatment of transsexuals? 
The most notorious legal example of gendered or sexual essentialism is the test set out 
by Ormrod J. in Corbett (1971), in which essential qualities fixed at birth define for legal 
purposes the sex of the legal subject. Even the more recent House of Lords decision in 
Bellinger, an otherwise progressive judgment, is somewhat essentialist, referring to the need 
for ‘objective criteria by which gender reassignment treatment could be assessed...’ (2003). 
Furthermore, even the Gender Recognition Act 2004, a comparatively progressive piece of 
legislation, begins with the requirement that subjects who seek to have their gender legally 
reassigned must be ‘living in the other gender’ (s 1 (1) (a)). The notion of there being fixed 
categories of ‘men’ and ‘women’ which can be ascertained by reference to supposedly 




Butler’s Conception of Gender 
If gender remains constant in the case of transsexed individuals, and the Gender 
Recognition Act requires individuals to be living in ‘the other’ gender, the first question to be 
asked is: what is the factor which remains constant; in other words - how may we seek to 
arrive upon a definition of gender? Turning back to Beauvoir’s conception of woman as the 
‘other’ to the ‘one’ of man, Irigaray supposes that the construction of binary gender 
categories (though she does not use the term ‘binary’) of male and female to be a more 
violent, ultimately hedonistic form of privileging the masculine in assigning definition to 
gender, characterised on ‘masculine parameters...the vagina is valued for the lodging it offers 
the male organ when the forbidden hand has to find a replacement for pleasure-giving’ 
(Irigaray, 1985). For instance, the Freudian notion of penis envy (Freud, 2009) is, for Irigaray, 
a hegemonic reiteration which devalues the feminine as merely supplementary to the 
hegemony of the ‘male’ (Irigaray, 1985: p.23) - ‘...there is no possible place for the 
“feminine”, except the traditional place of the repressed, the censured’ (Whitford, 1991: 
p.118). 
Butler begins Gender Trouble with a consideration of both Beauvoir and Irigaray. 
Whilst Beauvoir ‘turns to the failed reciprocity of an asymmetrical dialectic’, Irigaray 
‘suggests that the dialectic itself is the monologic elaboration of a masculinist signifying 
economy’ (Butler, 2008: p.18). Butler’s suggestion is that feminist critique continues to 
explore and (presumably) reject the ‘totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, 
but also remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism’ (Ibid). This 
bears the characteristic hallmarks of Butler’s dense and difficult style, but can be summed up 
as a rejection of the means by which feminism itself relies on a) the discursive construction of 
two demarcated gender categories and b) a conception of female identity as somehow 
universal or unique – that there is some shared experience of womanhood through which 
individuals can be united. It is from this starting point that Butler develops the concept of 
gender performativity, which is itself a blend of Foucault’s conception of repressive power’s 
presence in discursive regimes of truth (Foucault, 1991) with Derrida’s deconstruction and 
notions of iterability (Derrida, 1976) and Hegelian existentialism (Boucher, 2006: p.115). 
Butler’s theory furthermore relies on Althusser’s interpolation – a theory of subject-
formation, which is in itself an echo of Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ (Lacan, 1953: pp.11-17). 
Althusser’s theory of interpolation posits that individuals are all always existing within an 
ideology, and that individuals enter an ideology through the mistaken perception that they are 
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its subjects (Althusser trans. Brewster, 1971: pp. 127-186). Similarly, Butler’s conception of 
gender relies on the subconscious reiteration of a perceived notion of what constitutes the 
assigned gender role – male or female; ‘...a subject is hailed, the subject turns around, then 
accepts the terms by which he or she is hailed’ (Butler, 1995: 6). As Boucher notes, ‘because 
this effect of “hailing” is not a singular act, but a continuous repetition of ideological 
interpolations, the subject-citizen is constantly demonstrating their innocence through 
conformist practices’ (2006: p.120). If Butler is therefore correct, what is apparent in the case 
of gender is that the legal means by which legal subjects are either ‘male’ or ‘female’ is 
merely an instance of the law recognising a phenomenon which it is itself reproducing, rather 




A key part of Butler’s thought on gender is her notion of gender performativity and 
Butler’s use of the term ‘performativity’ and not ‘performance’ raises the question of how the 
former is distinct from the latter. In the preface to Bodies that Matter, Butler explains that one 
engaging in gender performance would be an ‘instrumental subject, one who decides on its 
gender.’ Such a subject ‘fails to realize that its existence is already decided by gender’ (Butler, 
1993). In other words, ‘performativity is not the act by which a subject brings into being what 
she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena 
that it regulates and constrains...’ (Ibid: 2) Also, Gangé et al note ‘...gender [and] gender 
identity is learned and achieved at the interactional level, reified at the cultural level, and 
institutionally enforced via the family law, religion, politics, economy, medicine and the 
media’ (1997: p.479). This echoes Foucault’s theory of sexual discourse, in which discursive 
constraints on what is acceptable and unacceptable modes of analysing and referring to sex 
and sexuality is a biopolitical practise, by which individuals are subject to regulatory 
practises defined by medical (and supposedly objective) parameters (Foucault, 1997). Sex is 
therefore as much a discursive construction as gender inasmuch as sex is a conception which 
brings together different elements or parts of bodies into an objective ‘truth’ of the body. 
For the purposes of our critique, therefore, essentialism, by means of its preference of 
the binary, cannot be a sufficient means of ascertaining an apparently enigmatic and elusive 
‘truth’ of gender. The assumption that there must be legally defined categories of men and 
women is the result of a hegemony in which law is the signifier and final arbiter in who is 
male and who is female, without consideration of subjects which may disrupt this framework. 
Claims to law’s objectivity regarding even the supposedly objective reality of sex is, in fact, 
as much subjected to repetition and rearticulation as the traditionally more fluid idea of 
gender. This echoes Monique Wittig, who argues that the construction of ontological 
difference via sexual, biological essentialism inevitably implies oppressive social categories 
of ‘one’ and the ‘other’, similar to Nietzschean masters and slaves, at least insofar as no 
agency to be ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in those setting the terms of discourse need be present, only 
those with power (the one; or the master) and those without (the other; or the slave) 
(Nietzsche, 1956: p.147) In ‘The Category of Sex’, Wittig argues: 
 
‘[d]ominance provides women with a body of data, of givens, of a prioris, 
which, all the more for being questionable, form a huge political construct, 
a tight network that affects everything, our thoughts, our gestures, our acts, 
our work, our feelings, our relationships’ (Wittig, 1992: p.4). 
 
It is, in other words, only possible to arrive at the hegemony of ‘gender’ by means of a 
discursive formation of ‘sex.’ Therefore, whilst gender is increasingly accepted as having a 
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psychological component, the masking of sex behind the veneer of scientific and, therefore, 
unquestionable objectivity forces people into one of two essential identities of either ‘male’ 
or ‘female’ which designates individuals with an identity which they are unable to choose for 
themselves and which is permanent (Herstein, 2010: p.50). As will become apparent, the 
Gender Recognition Act does little to change this – it simply reiterates the supposed 
permanence of gender and makes the reassignment an irreversible grant of a new gender (or, 
more accurately, a negation of the old) through parameters agreed upon by the state (see: 
Grabham, 2010: p.109). 
 
 
The legal treatment of transsexed individuals – an evolving human rights issue 
Historical binary subversion  
Before discussing the recent developments in the legal treatment of transsexed 
individuals, it should be noted that sexual transgression in terms of subversion of the binary 
conception of gender is not new. In fact, subversion of binary gender norms has a long 
history, with fourth-century Christian writers bemoaning the Roman pagan gali’s ‘deplorable 
mockery...[of] men taking the part of women, revealing with boastful ostentation this 
ignominy of impure and unchaste bodies’ (Roscoe, 1996: pp.195-230). Similarly, so-called 
‘gender transgression’ has been shown to occur in the ancient Mesopotamian region of Akkad 
and with the hijra of modern-day India and Pakistan (Ibid). Whilst an in-depth discussion of 
historic transgressions of gender categories is outside the scope of this essay, it is useful to 
note that subversion of ordinary gender roles is historically common and may, in fact, be 
considered as a societal norm; as something to be expected rather than treated as a mere 
statistical anomaly or cultural peculiarity. 
 
 
Gender at common law: Corbett v Corbett 
Perhaps the most well-known modern legal case concerning transsexed individuals is 
the first instance decision of Corbett v Corbett (1971). The case concerned the petitioner’s 
desire to have his marriage to a transsexual individual nullified on the basis that the person to 
whom he was married had undergone sexual reassignment surgery and was, therefore, 
biologically still male. As marriage was, by its legal definition, a union between a man and a 
woman (Hyde, 1866; Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 11 (c)) the only possible legal outcome, 
it was argued, was for the marriage to be declared null. Ormrod J., himself a former doctor, 
ruled in favour of the petitioner, establishing that it was not only necessary to establish that 
the respondent, the transsexual April Ashley (who had for some time been working as a 
successful female model), was either a man or a woman, but also that sex is an essential 
biological fact, fixed at birth. (Corbett, 1971: 106) Even prior to the recent legislative 
reforms, the decision in Corbett was criticised heavily by academics and by other judges, for 
instance, Martens J’s dissent in Cossey v UK  was critical of Corbett and of the UK’s 
treatment of transsexuals in general, characterising it as ‘instinctively hostile and negative’ 
(1991: p.646). As Kavanaugh argues, Ormrod ‘erred when suggesting that a male to female 
transsexual cannot perform the essential role of a woman in marriage, without defining what 
this essential role is’ (2005: p.23). Kavanaugh further argues that supposed ‘essential’ roles of 
women in marriage (such as the ability to have children) have never been grounds for 
divorce. Kavanaugh’s critique is particularly useful for our discussion, as it highlights the 
point that the attempt to define men and women with regards to their essential characteristics 
in Corbett is an attempt to impose essentialism onto subjects before the law; specifically 
allowing judges the role of deciding what is a man and what is a woman, without questioning 
the assumptions upon which essentialism is based. Furthermore, Whittle notes that Ormrod J 
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‘constantly mixed the notions of “male and female” with those of “man and woman” and that, 
‘[h]e argues that marriage is a relationship based on sex rather than gender’ (1996: p.366). 
Finally, Whittle criticises the essentialism in Corbett by considering Ormrod J’s judgment 
that normal intercourse was not possible on the grounds that the respondent had an artificial 
vagina: ‘the construction of an artificial vagina is not restricted to transsexuals, for some 
women also have reconstructive surgery in acute cases of vaginal atresia (absence or closure 
of a normal body orifice) before they are able to have sexual intercourse. Are these people 
“not women?” (Ibid: 367). The submission, therefore, is that Ormrod J’s decision in Corbett 
was wrongly decided precisely because it relied on a branch of biological essentialism and 
the supposed certainty inherent in marriage as a union based on sex as opposed to one based 
on gender.  
 
 
Understanding Corbett via Butler 
Butler’s submission is in fundamental opposition to the essentialism of Ormrod J in 
Corbett. In Gender Trouble, she wonders ‘[w]hat separates off ‘the body’ as indifferent to 
signification, and signification itself as the act of a radically disembodied consciousness or, 
rather, the act that radically disembodies that consciousness?’ (2008: p.176). This view is 
echoed by Irigaray, who supposes that in fields of discourse which claim objectivity (though 
Irigaray is specifically addressing science, we can presume to extend her critique to the 
supposedly objective or at least unbiased discipline of legal judgments), ‘[e]very piece of 
knowledge is produced by subjects in a given historical context. Even if that knowledge aims 
to be objective, even if its techniques are designed to ensure objectivity, [these forms of 
knowledge] always display certain choices...determined by the sex of the scholars involved’ 
(Irigaray, 1993: p.204). 
Though Ormrod J. made some acknowledgement of the distinction between sex and 
gender (Corbett, 1971: p.107), the submission of Butler and Irigaray is that a simple 
declaration of the objective reality of sex as distinct from the performative gender is 
insufficient. If we apply Butler directly to Ormrod J’s judgment in Corbett, the permeating 
need to establish a category of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ is indicative of a ‘homophobic signifying 
economy’ which aims to avoid ‘polluted’ categories of persons (i.e. non-heterosexual) 
(Butler, 2008: 180).  Indeed, one senses a certain kind of squeamishness in the language used 
in the judgment in Corbett, with its descriptions of homosexuals as ‘sexual deviants’ and its 
regard of the facts as ‘essentially pathetic’ (1971: p.92) (Martens J, in his dissenting judgment 
in Cossey also sensed this, noting Ormrod’s ‘[use of] terms which scarcely veil his distaste’ 
(1991: p.644)). Even if one sets aside this rather unfortunate use of language as mere rhetoric 
or simply irrelevant and instead treat Corbett as an exercise in biological essentialism, it is 
nonetheless indicative of a hegemony which treats bodies as the central focus of the law 
surrounding transsexuals - as structural, immovable totalities onto which, Butler argues, 
gender is subsequently inscribed (Butler, 2008: p.186). The preference of biological 
characteristics (specifically chromosomal, genital and gonadal) factors in determining sex 
was upheld and extended from the realm of merely family law to English criminal law by the 
Court of Appeal in the criminal case R v Tan, in which Parker J. rejected the defendant’s 
submission that psychological factors be taken into consideration for the purposes of the 
Sexual Offences Acts of 1956 and 1967 (1983: p.1064). Tan therefore widened the scope of 
the Corbett method of determination of sex beyond family law and, holding that a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual would be convicted as a male living on the earnings of 
prostitution. 
The legal system in the UK has more recently recognised the rights of transsexuals, 
with the introduction of the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 (SI 
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1999/1102) prohibiting discrimination of transsexuals largely in the field of employment 
(with an exception for appointment of religious ministers). Subsequently, the courts were 
more sympathetic in their judgments concerning transsexuals, as in the case of A v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire Police (2005) in which a male-to-female post-operative 
transsexual had been refused employment on the basis that she would not be able to carry out 
all her duties as a police constable, specifically the requirement in section 54(9) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that personal searches of detained persons be conducted by 
someone ‘of the same sex as the person searched.’ Lord Bingham rejected the reasoning of 
the Chief Constable, stating that nobody who was of the same gender as the one the post-
operative transsexual could reasonably object to intimate searches (A, 2005: 58). Legal rights 
of transsexuals were further recognised by the UK Government’s April 2000 Report of the 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People (2000: Web) which, whilst not 
explicitly recommending any change in the way the UK treats transsexual citizens, 
nonetheless outlined possibilities for reform in the UK legal system for gender reassignment.  
In terms of UK domestic case law, perhaps the most significant recent judgment prior 
to the 2004 Gender Recognition Act is Bellinger v Bellinger. The case involved a post-
operative male to female transsexual, who sought a declaration that her marriage to her 
husband was valid under the Family Law Act 1986. The Court of Appeal relied on the 
standard Corbett test to declare that the marriage was invalid (Bellinger, 2002). On appeal to 
the House of Lords, this declaration of invalidity was ultimately upheld (Bellinger, 2003). 
What distinguishes Bellinger from judgments like Corbett, however, is the detailed 
recognition of the existence of gender dysphoria and its importance in the assignment of 
gender recognised in Lord Nicholls’ judgment (Ibid: 471). Furthermore, Lord Nicholls 
acknowledged that s 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act was incompatible with the 
European Convention. The reason for upholding the Court of Appeal’s decision was one of 
constitutionality, rather than issues surrounding gender á la Corbett – that matters of such 
importance should be for Parliament to decide and not the courts. Nonetheless, Bellinger, as 
mentioned above, still demonstrates jurisprudential insistence on essential fixed categories of 
men and women, determined by an underlying, unalterable scientific ‘truth’: ‘[i]ndividuals 
cannot choose for themselves whether they wish to be known or treated as male or female. 
Self-definition is not acceptable. That would make nonsense of the underlying biological 
basis of the distinction’ (Ibid: 477). What is clear from even a relatively forward-thinking 
judgment like Bellinger is, as Cowan notes, that the ‘law continues to engage with 
transsexuality in a way that attempts to biologise and heterosexualise even the ‘queerest’ 
subject (Cowan, 2004: p.91). Jurisprudentially, therefore, ‘transsexuals certainly do not 
constitute a third sex’ (P v S and Cornwall County Council, 1996) and the ‘recognition’ of 
transsexuals is at its heart an assimilation of the transsexual subject into the binary 
heteronormative order – the transsexual is forced to choose between one or the other and 




In the past, the European Court of Human Rights allowed the UK a fairly wide margin 
of appreciation in denying transsexuals the legal recognition of their gender. The first case in 
which a transsexual made an application under the ECHR was Van Oosterwijck v Belgium 
(1981) in which the applicant, a Belgian lawyer, argued that the Belgian legal requirement to 
carry identification everywhere constituted a violation of his Article 8 and Article 12 rights 
(respectively: right to respect for private and family life and right to marriage). The court 
found that there had been a violation of both Article 8 and Article 12 rights, but that as 
domestic remedies for those breaches had not been exhausted, the court was unable to hear 
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the case on its merits. The first European case concerning UK transsexuals was Rees v UK, in 
which the facts were similar, but allowing a wide margin of appreciation to the UK in the 
absence of a European consensus, the UK’s refusal to issue a new birth certificate to a post-
operative transsexual was found to not be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. 
Subsequently, there were some piecemeal developments in the legal status of transsexuals in 
the UK, such as the above-mentioned P v S and Cornwall City Council (1996) in which it 
was held that discrimination based on gender reassignment was a violation of Article 5(1) of 
Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 (forbidding workplace discrimination 
based on sex). The wider picture, however, was left largely unchanged and the legal status of 
transsexuals remaining in their birth gender remained. 
The two most important modern European judgments regarding the legal status of 
transsexuals in the United Kingdom are the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions in 
Goodwin v UK (2002) and I v UK (2003).  In Goodwin, the applicant, a male to female post-
operative transsexual, alleged that the failure of the United Kingdom to recognise her as a 
female for the purposes of social security, pensions and retirement age constituted a breach of 
Article 8, Article 12, Article 13 and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Respectively: right to respect for private and family life, right to marriage, right to an 
effective remedy for breaches of the convention and protection from discrimination). The 
ECtHR held that there was a violation of Articles 8 and 12 (and Article 14, though there were 
no further legal issues raised by that Article in particular). Furthermore, she had undergone 
harassment at work, resulting in a sexual harassment case in the Industrial Tribunal, which 
failed because she was considered by law to be a man (2002: 455). The ECtHR gave a 
detailed overview of the evolving status of UK transsexuals, noting that out of the 37 
Member States of the Council of Europe, only four (including the UK, the others being 
Ireland, Andorra and Albania (BBC News, 2002: Web) did not permit a change of birth 
certificate after gender reassignment surgery (Goodwin, 2002: p.465). The distinction from 
Rees, then, was that a consensus could now be said to exist on the legal status of transsexuals 
across member states. Furthermore, the court considered the legal status of transsexuals in 
other jurisdictions, particularly the Australian case of Re Kevin which made explicit reference 
to the Corbett test, rejecting it on the basis that it ‘would impose indefensible suffering on 
people who have already had more than their share of difficulty, with no benefit to society’ 
(2001). Specifically, Goodwin rejected Corbett-style biological essentialism: ‘[t]he Court is 
not persuaded therefore that the state of medical science or scientific knowledge provides any 
determining argument as regards the legal recognition of transsexuals’ (2002: p.473). The 
facts and legal issues in I were virtually identical, differing in largely superficial ways and so 
a detailed examination of both cases is not necessary. It need only be mentioned that the 
rejection of Corbett essentialism was identical in I as it was in Goodwin, to the point where 
both judgments use the same phrase to rule against Corbett. (I, 2003: 63). 
 
 
Statutory framework: The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
The debate 
As a result of Goodwin and I, the UK government began debating a Gender 
Recognition Bill designed to give rights to transsexuals who were living ‘in a state of limbo, 
between the gender in which they are living and the gender in which they were born; because 
that is how the law defines them’ (HC Deb, 2003: Col 66-68). The second reading of the 
Gender Recognition Bill further refers to the need to ‘enable same-sex partners to acquire a 
legal status for their relationships’ (HC Deb, 2004: Col 48) (this, presumably, refers to the 
Ormrod J’s declaration that the marriage in Corbett was null and void due to the petitioner’s 
status as a male transsexual). Though there was some Conservative opposition to the bill per 
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se (Mr. Andrew Robathan MP dismissed it as ‘the most arrant nonsense’) (Ibid: Col 53) the 
general consensus in Parliament was that gender dysphoria was a medical condition ‘whereby 
a person feels driven to live in the opposite gender’ (Ibid: Col 55). The issue, then, was a 
classical liberal, rights-based issue of the human rights of transsexuals to ‘enjoy the rights 




The Gender Recognition Act was ultimately passed and goes some way to addressing 
the long standing problems inherent in the Corbett favourability of biological characteristics; 
of sex rather than gender. In a particularly radical shift from the Corbett  favourability of 
fixed medical criteria, there is no requirement for one applying for gender reassignment to 
have undergone any kind of surgical procedure (S 2) eliminating the pre/post-operative 
distinction. Furthermore, the acquired gender is recognised ‘for all purposes’ (S 9), with an 
exemption for sports bodies in order to ensure fair competition (S 19 (2) (a)). Whilst this goes 
some way to recognising the psychological aspect of gender and no doubt a positive move 
away from Corbett, Cowan notes that there is still a reliance on medical expert opinion in the 
submission of evidence to the Gender Recognition Panel: ‘[t]here is no telling what kinds of 
views on sex or sexuality those “experts” will hold’ (Cowan, 2005: p.76).  Sharpe further 
notes that ‘the grounding of claims in disability has obvious potential for negative discursive 
fallout for transgender people, given that of necessity such a strategy relies on a view of 
transgender people as psychiatrically disordered’ (Sharpe, 2002: p.138).  This medicalisation 
of transsexualism as a mental illness was especially present in the House of Lords’ debate on 
the Bill, with Baroness O’ Cathain equating transsexualism with other irrational phobias or 
delusions: 
‘If a person is paranoid and believes that he is being chased by secret agents, we do 
not hire a 24-hour bodyguard and buy them elaborate security devices. Similarly, if a person 
suffers from agoraphobia, we do not brick them into their home. Yet, instead of getting them 
all possible psychological help, surgeons trap transsexual people in their delusion by 
performing sex reassignment surgery’ (HL Deb, 2003: Col 1310).  
The medicalisation of transsexualism in the Gender Recognition Act therefore 
preserves in spirit the notion of Corbett that behind the cases of transsexualism there lies an 
attainable ‘truth’ of the gendered subject which can be realised through measured, 
dispassionate scientific analysis and which precedes the subject itself. As Sandland argues, 
the s2 (1) (a) requirement that individuals be first diagnosed as mentally disordered before 
they can successfully reassigned reveals the law’s focus on not the expectations of the 
individual applicant, but on the ‘truth’ of the medical diagnosis. The Gender Recognition Act, 
therefore, requires transsexuals to ‘forever abandon their gender ambiguity in return for 
recognition’ (Sandland, 2009: p.255).  
Furthermore, Whittle notes the dubious nature of the requirement that those already 
married or in civil partnerships end their current marriage or civil partnership and register a 
new one, either a marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act or a civil partnership under the 
Civil Partnerships Act 2004 as ‘simply a sop to the Christian lobby’ (Whittle, 2005: p.271). 
Sandland is, meanwhile, less forgiving: ‘[a]ny legislation which requires to a happy and 
legally valid marriage to have that marriage set aside in order to preserve the purity of an 
increasingly outdated ideal can hardly be described as a great leap forward’ (2009: p.255).  
Our discussion thus far has largely been concerned with the distinction between sex 
and gender and the evolution of the law in recognising this distinction, on grounds which rely 
heavily on classical liberalism. However, Cowan argues that this distinction itself is part of 
the need to establish a dichotomous framework in which transsexed subjects are made to ‘fit’ 
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into a certain category, lest they be a threat to the heteronormative order (Cowan, 2005: p.72) 
(for Butler, heterosexuality is itself a discursive production; ‘an effect of the sex/gender 
system which purports merely to describe it’ (Jagose, 1996: p. 84)). This is further outlined 
by Speer and Potter, who, in positing a ‘real world’ application of Butlerian gender concepts 
by pairing performativity with discursive psychology, state ‘[h]eterosexism normalizes 
heterosexuality and buttresses a rigidly demarcated two gender system (2002: p.174). 
Cowan’s further submission is that the Gender Recognition Act merely shifts the focus of 
law’s reliance on sex to gender, whilst keeping both categories intact (2005: p.79). As Sharpe 
argues ‘reform that is channelled through categories other than sex enables law to distribute 
marginal groups around sex whilst maintaining intact a traditional and (bio)logical 
understanding of sex’ (Sharpe, 2002: p.138). The question is whether temporality can be a 
suitable framework for UK law, rather than the current structuralist framework of binary 
gender categories. Is Butler’s philosophy or, perhaps more appropriately, a philosophy of 




The ‘feminist struggle’ and the practical goals of Butlerian concepts 
One of the most pressing criticisms of Butler’s conception of gender is that it lacks, or 
has so far failed to demonstrate, any political applicability. For instance, Fraser argues that 
Butler is ‘deeply anti-humanist’ and that her infamous linguistic obscurity is ‘far enough 
removed from our everyday ways of talking and thinking about ourselves to require some 
justification. Why should we use such a self-distancing idiom? What are its theoretical 
advantages (and disadvantages)? What is its likely political impact? In the absence of any 
attention to these issues, [Butler] at times projects an aura of esotericism unredeemed by any 
evident gains’ (Fraser, 1995: p.67). 
The charge made here is that post-structuralism is inherently abstract and lacks 
political applicability or the capacity for true social change. Nussbaum makes a similar point, 
and contends that much gender-based scholarship engages in a ‘virtually complete turning 
from the material side of life, toward a type of verbal and symbolic politics that makes only 
the flimsiest of connections with the real situation of real women’ (Nussbaum, 1999: p.38). 
Furthermore, Nussbaum argues that in reality, linguistic obscurity conceals simplistic and 
unoriginal ideas in Butler’s work: 
 
‘When Butler’s notions are stated clearly and succinctly, one sees that, 
without a lot more distinctions and arguments, they don’t go far, and they 
are not especially new. Thus obscurity fills the void left by an absence of a 
real complexity of thought and argument’ (Ibid: 39) 
 
As has been discussed earlier, the charge that Butler’s idea of performativity is not a 
philosophy sui generis is largely true, insofar as it is a reapplication to the field of gender 
studies of, amongst others, Nietzschean-Foucauldian conceptions of power with Althusserian-
Lacanian theories of subject-formation. Nussbaum goes some way to restating Butler’s 
performativity in a clear and concise manner. Performativity is, Nussbaum argues, somewhat 
backed empirically by the means by which adults treat children based on the gender they 
believe the baby to have. If it is a girl, it will be cuddled, bounced if a boy; its crying will be 
perceived as anger from a boy, fear from a girl (Ibid: 41). Nussbaum’s critique of Butler is 
that the supposition that there is nothing inert in babies prior to their experience via 
discursive constraints such as gender lacks an empirical basis. Nussbaum contends that Butler 
instead prefers ‘to remain on the high plane of metaphysical abstraction’ (Ibid). rather than 
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engage in empirical applications of performativity. Furthermore, Fraser contends that Butler’s 
dismissal of subjectivation (by viewing subjects as constructed via exclusion – the ‘one’ and 
the ‘other’) demonstrates irreverence to the feminist struggle and lacks historical merit 
(Fraser, 1995: pp. 68-69). The submission Fraser makes, therefore, is to reformulate both 
post-structuralism and Critical Theory, in which ‘we might conceive subjectivity as endowed 
with critical capacities and as culturally constructed (Ibid: 71). What seems to be the main 
critique of Butler from Nussbaum, meanwhile is that her work is built on a quietism in which 
Foucauldian systems of power become inescapable; subversions of perceived norms 
becoming the preferred means of resistance (Butler, 1997). As Nussbaum argues, slavery and 
laws regarding rape ‘were changed by feminists who would not give parodic performance as 
their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and would, yield before justice’ 
(Nussbaum, 1999: p. 43) How, then, might one seek to liberate Butlerian notions of power 
and subject-formation from this defeatism or constraint to the purely theoretical? Is such 
liberation possible? 
As has been demonstrated already, the UK legal system has made some significant 
progress in acknowledging the non-essentialist nature of gender, demonstrated by the grant of 
significant rights to transsexuals. This notion of non-essentialism, however, is not strictly 
Butlerian, or even Beavourian. Non-essentialist conceptions of gender exist in philosophical 
texts much earlier than The Second Sex, or Gender Trouble, such as in John Stuart Mills’ 
essay On the Subjection of Women: ‘I deny that anyone knows, or can know, the nature of the 
two sexes, as long as they have only been seen in their present relation to one another...’ here, 
Mills seems to be acknowledging the specifically discursive nature of gender, that it is 
defined according to what it is set against. Furthermore ‘[w]hat is now called the nature of 
women is an eminently artificial thing — the result of forced repression in some directions, 
unnatural stimulation in others’ (Mill, 1998: p. 453).  
It is argued that the problem with a sincere application of Butlerian concepts as a way 
to structure social change is that, if Butler is read as a continuance of Foucault, such 
Foucauldian systems of power, with the denial of individual agency and the scepticism 
regarding inert characteristics which precede discursive influences, are also inherently 
sceptical of the possibilities for social change. As Boucher argues ‘[t]he problem is that this 
[Foucaldian interpretation] arguably resulted in a form of objectivist determinism that 
prevents the emergence of effective resistance while mechanically reducing the subject to an 
effect of institutional socialisation’ (Boucher, 2006: p. 123). Butler goes some ways to 
distinguishing her ideas of subject-formation and agency from Foucault in her contributions 
to Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (‘[i]t does not follow...that we are all always-already 
trapped, and that there is no resistance to regulation or to the form of subjection that 
regulation takes’) (Butler, Laclau & Žižek, 2000: p. 151). However, Butler still remains 
fundamentally sceptical, if not dismissive, of the positive effects of social and political 
change. In the case of rights to marriage for gay and lesbian couples, for instance, she argues 
‘those who seek marriage identify not only with those who have gained the blessing of the 
state, but with the state itself. Thus the petition not only augments state power, but accepts the 
state as the necessary venue for democratization itself’ (Ibid: 176). In other words – in order 
to view the acceptance of transsexuals as a political end, one first needs to accept that the 
state assigned the signifying role of who is acceptable and who is not in the heteronormative 
framework. The Gender Recognition Act, therefore, is not only essentialist, but is still part of 
a larger regulatory contingency of discursive and regulatory constraints on the sexual conduct 
of individuals, which harkens back to Foucault (1991). 
This does not, however, imply that there is no place for Butler’s brand of post-
structuralism within legal discourse and as Herstein argues, Butler’s theory and post-
structuralism in general is best read as a scepticism of grand, unifying moral theories, 
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institutions, etc. rather than a rejection of them outright (2010). What seems to be obvious 
throughout Butler’s work is an implicit assumption that individuals should be fairly 
represented in the law and that regulation ‘determines, more or less, what we are, what we 
can be’ (2001). Whilst Sharpe praises the Gender Recognition Act for its renunciation of the 
requirement for individuals to undergo sex-reassignment surgery, ‘[the] law has not divorced 
itself from a concern with the body’ (2009). In other words, the Gender Recognition Act is an 
exercise of biopolitical power, in which the ‘self’ of gender is exercised through a 
legal/discursive fixation on the body as opposed to ‘a self that is beyond discourse itself’ 
(Butler, 2001). Whilst it is clearly not the place of law to ruminate on such concepts as the 
metaphysical self or notions of ‘I’ and it is difficult to imagine a discursive construction of 
that which is outside discourse, we can still aim to detach legal discourse from the structured 
binary categories in which the exercise of biopolitical elaborations of male and female leave 
the transsexual self without legal expression – as legal unmentionables whose existence is 
merely disruptive of the heteronormative order and is to be medicalised and remedied – the 
subject brought back to the fray through the act of recognition. Butlerian thought, therefore, 
might view the Gender Recognition Act as a piece of legislation which still falls into the same 
trap of Corbett, since it treats transsexuals as subjects to be identified according to a 
supposedly objective biopolitical criteria, regulated and treated as mentally disordered and 




As has been demonstrated, there has been significant progress in the role of 
democratization with regards to transsexual individuals. Where the law set out by Corbett 
treated transsexuals people as non-persons, there is now a recognition that gender dysphoria 
is a serious issue for a minority of people in the United Kingdom. The Labour government 
was especially forthcoming in granting democratic rights to individuals suffering from a lack 
of legal recognition of the gender they actually inhabit. Whittle and others have criticised the 
bill on these classically liberal terms, arguing that, for all its positive aspects, the Gender 
Recognition Act still treats transsexuals as people suffering from congenital disorders. 
Nonetheless, if we accept the liberal framework, the Gender Recognition Act is a positive 
move forward. 
What the Gender Recognition Act 2004 fails to do, however, is consider the 
possibility of an order beyond the binary notions of male and female and treats transsexuals 
as individuals subject to assimilation within a heteronormative framework. The Corbett test 
used the scientific ‘reality’ of sex as its basis for denying transsexuals rights and the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, similarly, uses the language of scientific certainty to make the law’s 
focus the ‘truth’ of the gender of the applicants as opposed to the applicant’s self-
identification. The individual ‘is brought back into the gendered order and their problematic 
past...is rendered, so far as law can do it, invisible’ (Sandland, 2009: p. 254). What this essay 
has demonstrated is that other possibilities for conceptualising transsexuals in the legal sphere 
do exist and may in fact be more useful than the current adopted framework in providing 
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